The trouble with the Troubled Families Programme – repeating the failed attempts of the past by Crossley, Stephen
8/18/2016
The trouble with the Troubled Families Programme –
repeating the failed attempts of the past
blogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy/the-trouble-with-the-troubled-families-programme-repeating-the-failed-
attempts-of-the-past/
The Troubled Families Programme is once again in trouble in the news. A previous blog post showed how
the policy was rolled out without proper evaluation. Here, Stephen Crossley and Michael Lambert outline the
historical precedents for this type of family intervention policy, and argue that by not learning from past mistakes, the
current programme is doomed to repeat them.
Louise Casey, Director-General of the Troubled Families Programme from 2012-15, said in her 2012 report
Listening to Troubled Families that:
This new programme of work with 120,000 troubled families is an opportunity to not repeat the failed
attempts of the past but to get underneath the skin of the families, and of the services that are now
going to be working with them.
Despite being a history graduate Casey’s claim ‘not to repeat the failed attempts of the past’ has been shown by
historians John Welshman and Pat Starkey to be flawed.  The idea that some families pass on their supposed
behavioural shortcomings across the generations is far from new.  Neither is the idea that the state services
engaged with these families are inadequate and need reforming.  The ‘suppressed’ evaluation of the Programme by
Ecorys leaked last week found that it had ‘no discernible’ effect on its self-stated criteria of unemployment, truancy
or criminality.  But clearly there are those who are still not listening.
We can in fact go right back to evaluations of ‘problem families’ in the 1940s and 1950s to shed light on these
continued ‘failed attempts of the past.’ In 1950 a government circular advised local authorities to appoint a
designated ‘problem families’ officer to develop policies in their areas, much as the current Programme has
appointed Troubled Families Coordinators.  They were given powers to create registers of local ‘problem families’,
hold meetings to prevent ‘overlapping’ of services and advised to identify families earlier for quick and cost-effective
intervention.
A 1954 report on the operation of this system in Manchester and Salford saw the problem in similar terms to Casey
from her 2012 report:
Poverty, disease, broken homes, overcrowding, frequent pregnancies, unwanted children, ignorance,
apathy, mental instability, alcoholism, and the rest, all appear among these families.
And it also found the state services and bureaucratic framework part of the problem:
We need to pick the people best able to help the families in troubled and leave them to get on with the
job, unencumbered by more inter-departmental rivalries and more sub-divisions of social work.
The report saw teams of intensive, low-caseload workers in the best position to help families ‘be “converted” to a
new way of life’, much like being ‘turned around’ today.  Despite this support, the report remained sceptical of cost-
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effectiveness, dwelt on the problems of defining ‘problem families and the stigmatisation for families labelled as
‘inferior citizens.’
Supporters of local policies – often ‘designated officers’ – touted anecdotal evidence of ‘spectacular’ success in
rehabilitating families.  Particularly Family Service Units, which emerged to deal with problem families, pushed their
‘friendship with a purpose’ as a method of proven success in helping families to help themselves.  Despite numerous
impressionistic local evaluations and the expansion of problem family policies across the country, it was only with
the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the mid-1960s that they fell out of fashion.  Unproven, anecdotal and written by
advocates, ‘problem family’ evaluations are the clear precursor to the policy-based evidence which underpinned the
‘success’ of the Troubled Families Programme.
Local authorities are expected to run their local troubled families schemes using the ‘family intervention’ model.
Casey, who was involved in the initial roll-out of Family Intervention Projects (FIP) across England under New
Labour, has stated that ‘we know it [family intervention] works because we’ve already looked at studies that show
that this works, basically, and also I’ve met countless families that have been turned around.’ This is certainly one
reading of the research evidence surrounding the family intervention approach, yet when examining numerous
government evaluations of FIPs – including one cited by Cameron at the launch of the Troubled Families
Programme – a different picture can also emerge. David Gregg, in a forensic examination of some of the FIP
evaluations, and which sounds remarkably relevant to the recent TFP news, noted
the discontinuities between the headline government claims for FIP success, the strong caveats and
reservations of the three FIP evaluation teams over a decade and the marked weaknesses in
evaluation methodology and database quality
Gregg, in arguing that FIPs are a ‘classic case of policy-based evidence’, also highlights that: claims for success
were based on qualitative measures and very small family samples which the evaluators conceded were biased; no
control groups were used and much of the evidence relied on the views of those involved with the project; and, no
longitudinal studies had been commissioned despite three sets of researchers suggesting that such an approach
would help to address questions about the longevity of any improvements in the longer term. The most recent
government evaluation of FIPs, published back in December 2011 acknowledges that whilst FIPs appear to be
associated with some improvements in families, in some areas such as anti-social behaviour (ASB), there is:
limited evidence that ASB FIPs generate better outcomes than other non-FIP interventions on family
functioning or health issues, although FIPs do appear to be at least as effective as these alternatives
Other research also appears to cast doubt on the official view that family intervention style approaches work. There
is a paucity of evidence that improved co-ordination of service delivery to families who are ‘high cost and high harm’,
something that FIPs purport to achieve, improves outcomes for those families. And the official evaluation of the
Family Nurse Partnership, a programme aimed at supporting young mothers, found that it was ‘no more effective
than routinely available healthcare’ in improving any of the primary outcomes of the programme, which included
reducing smoking in pregnancy, increasing birth weight and reducing rates of emergency attendance or hospital
admission for any reason. The researchers concluded quite starkly that there was ‘little advantage’ to be gained
from adding the partnership to existing service provision for young mothers.
So in direct contrast to Casey’s assertion that ‘we know family intervention works’, the weight of evidence
surrounding ‘family intervention’ and similar approaches, over the longue durée, actually suggests that the approach
doesn’t work. In failing to learn from the mistakes of the past, Casey and others involved in promoting the TFP, are
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doomed to simply repeat them.
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